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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a). 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Whether the Labor Commission applied the correct standard for legal causation as 
established by Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-106(2)? 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-106 
(1) Physical, mental, or emotional diseases related to mental stress arising out of 
and in the course of employment shall be compensable under this chapter only when 
there is a sufficient legal and medical causal connection between the employee's disease 
and employment. 
(2)(a) Legal causation requires proof of extraordinary mental stress arising 
predominantly and directly from employment. 
(b) The extraordinary nature of the alleged mental stress is judged according to an 
objective standard in comparison with contemporary national employment and 
nonemployment life. 
(3) Medical causation requires proof that the physical, mental, or emotional 
disease was medically caused by the mental stress that is the legal cause of the physical, 
mental, or emotional disease. 
(4) Good faith employer personnel actions including disciplinary actions, work 
evaluations, job transfers, layoffs, demotions, promotions, terminations, or retirements, 
may not form the basis of compensable mental stress claims under this chapter. 
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(5) Alleged discrimination, harassment, or unfair labor practices otherwise 
actionable at law may not form the basis of compensable mental stress claims under this 
chapter. 
(6) An employee who alleges a compensable occupational disease involving 
mental stress bears the burden of proof to establish legal and medical causation by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a Petition for Review seeking review of the final order of the Appeals 
Board of the Utah Labor Commission. The issue presented is an issue of first impression 
in this Court. 
Petitioner, Nancy M. Wood, filed an Application for Hearing with the Utah Labor 
Commission on February 26, 2001 seeking disability compensation for employment 
related mental stress. (R. page 1). Administrative Law Judge Debbie Hahn held a 
hearing on Mrs. Wood's claim for disability on March 6, 2002. (R. page 149). ALJ 
Hahn issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law & Interim Order on August 20, 2002, 
finding that Mrs. Wood suffered a compensable occupational disease in the course and 
scope of her employment at Eastern Utah Broadcasting. (R. page 50-51). The ALJ also 
dismissed the Employer's Reinsurance Fund from the case finding that Mrs. Wood's 
claim did not arise until after July 1, 1994, the last date on which the Employer's 
Reinsurance fund could have had liability on this claim.1 (R. page 76). Finally, the ALJ 
1
 Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-702 provides that the Employers' Reinsurance Fund has no 
liability for industrial accidents occurring after July 1, 1994. 
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referred the claim to a medical panel to determine the portion of Mrs. Wood's current 
medical condition attributable to the industrial disease claim. (R. page 53-54). 
The Medical Panel issued a report dated November 12, 2002, finding that 50% of 
Mrs. Wood's current medical condition was attributable to the industrial disease claim. 
(R. pages 56-61). ALJ Hahn issued a decision that incorporated the findings from her 
Interim Order and the medical panel findings on July 30, 2003. (R. pages 65-77). The 
ALJ ordered the respondents to begin paying Ms. Wood weekly benefits and 50%> of 
reasonable medical care. (R. page 76). 
Respondents filed a Motion for Review with the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor 
Commission on August 29, 2003. (R. pages 83-130). On October 18, 2004, the Appeals 
Board issued its decision reversing the ALJ's decision and granting the respondents 
Motion for Review. (R. page 138-143). The Appeals board found that Mrs. Wood had 
not shown that the mental stress she had experienced was extraordinary when objectively 
compared with the normal stress of the modern work environment. (R. page 141). The 
Appeals Board decision was the final decision of the Labor Commission in this case. 
Mrs. Wood filed a Petition for Review with this Court on November 15, 2004, seeking 
review of the Labor Commission's final decision. (R. pages 145 & 147). 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Mrs. Wood was employed by Eastern Utah Broadcasting ("EUB") beginning in 
1980. (Hearing page 23).2 She stayed with the company until March 16, 2000, when she 
was forced to leave because of a nervous breakdown. (Medical page 22).3 Mrs. Wood's 
initial position at EUB was as a salesperson. (Hearing page 24). Her duties included 
selling the radio spots, gathering information to write the spot, and collections and 
billing. (Hearing page 24). She was required to call each of her accounts at lease once 
each week. (Hearings page 30). From the beginning, her work involved a significant 
amount of stress. 
Mrs. Wood was given 50 accounts when she first started. (Hearing page 25). She 
was responsible for every aspect of these accounts and was the key person responsible for 
all contact with the client as well as all administrative duties. (Hearing page 24). In 1981 
she was sent to her first "boot camp" training required by EUB. (Hearing pages 24-25). 
The training was extremely intense and involved public ridicule. (Hearing pages 24-25). 
She attended this training about once each year for the entire time she worked at EUB. 
(Hearing page 25). 
Mrs. Wood's responsibilities at EUB rapidly increased. Once she learned the 
ropes she was given more and more accounts to handle. (Hearing page 28). EUB 
2
 The hearing transcript is identified in the record as page 149. The original transcript 
numbering is then used to identify the pages within the transcript. For ease of reference 
the hearing transcript will simply be identified as "Hearing" in this brief. 
3
 The medical records exhibit is identified in the record as page 148. The original 
numbering of the medical records exhibit used at the administrative level is the used to 
identify pages within the medical record. For ease of reference the medical records 
exhibit is identified as "Medical" in this brief. 
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downsized and within the first five years of working at EUB the sales staff had dropped 
from four to two. The two remaining salespeople handled all of the accounts previously 
handled by four. (Hearing page 28). In 1986 EUB started a shopping show business, 
which again doubled Mrs. Wood's workload. (Hearing page 32). By the late 1980's 
Mrs. Wood was the only sales person and was responsible for all 200 of EUB's accounts. 
(Hearing pages 37-38). Other salespeople were hired but the turnover was so frequent 
that Mrs. Wood was responsible for all of the accounts for years at a time. (Hearing page 
41). In 1997 she became the sales manager and assumed the responsibilities of hiring and 
training new salespeople as well as handling her own accounts. (Hearing pages 55-56). 
During her entire employment at EUB Mrs. Wood was under considerable stress. 
She carried two cell phones and often received calls as early as 5:00 A.M. and as late as 
11:00 P.M. (Hearing page 47). It was not uncommon for both phones to be ringing at 
the same time. (Hearing page 46). Her job also involved considerable travel to meet 
with clients and help produce early morning remote radio shows. (Hearing pages 38 & 
39). She was taught and encouraged to just get the job done no matter what it took. 
(Hearing page 95). One fellow employee was even yelled at because she did not answer 
the phone while she was in the bathroom. (Hearing page 62). Mrs. Wood often began 
work at 5:00 A.M. when she wrote the memos she needed to write for the day. (Hearing 
page 46). She would then be at the office by 7:30 A.M. (Hearing page 59). She would 
often work until 6:00 or 7:00 P.M., or even later. (Hearing page 59). She was available 
even on weekends to answer her telephones. (Hearing page 47). The company policy 
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was that she was available from 8:30 A.M. until 5:30 P.M, (Hearing page 61), but she 
was told to do whatever it took to get the job done, (Hearing page 95). 
Aside from the stress of being available at all hours, Mrs. Wood was frequently 
yelled at by the owner of EUB, Tom Anderson, and "ripped" by her clients. (Hearing 
pages 107-08). She had full responsibility for her accounts from sale to collection. 
(Hearing page 86). Even if someone else made a mistake she took the blame. (Hearing 
pages 46-47). Mrs. Wood always did her job no matter what it took because she lived in 
fear that someone would check her work and find that she had not done what she was 
supposed to have done. (Hearing page 83). 
Mr. Anderson was an intense boss who did not have a lot of patience. (Hearing 
page 84). Other employees had quit because the stress level was too high for them. 
(Hearing page 87). Mr. Anderson yelled at Mrs. Wood in front of others at the station, 
during meetings, and while talking with clients. (Hearing pages 101-02 & 108). Mr. 
Anderson told her that if someone made him mad then he would get even and the person 
would not know where it came from. (Hearing page 100). She feared that if she left 
EUB Mr. Anderson would make sure that she was not able to find work in Price again. 
(Hearing page 99). 
Mrs. Wood experienced her first episode of significant mental stress in 1986 while 
in the "boot camp" training. (Hearing page 32). When she returned from the boot camp 
she took a medical leave of absence at her doctor's recommendation. (Hearing page 32, 
Medical page 38). When she attempted to return to work after being away for about a 
month her salary was cut in half. (Hearing page 85-86). She remained off work for 
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several months and had begun another job before she was invited to return to EUB at the 
regular starting salary for a new EUB salesperson. (Hearing page 35). 
She continued to have anxiety attacks at various stressful times of work such as 
Christmas. (Hearing page 63). She began taking medications to help her with repeated 
panic attacks and spent considerable time in relaxation activities. (Hearing page 64). She 
did not seek therapy or psychiatric care. (Hearing pages 64-65). 
On March 16, 2000, Mrs. Wood had a nervous breakdown. (Hearing page 44). 
She began crying and was unable to stop. (Hearing page 44). She was completely non-
functional and her husband had to call EUB to let them know she would not be coming 
in. (Hearing pages 77-78). All of the parties agreed that Mrs. Wood was disabled at the 
time of the hearing because of her anxiety. (Hearing pages 13 & 17). 
Facts Supporting Mrs, Wood's Disability Claim 
Mrs. Wood saw several physicians to treat her anxiety. She began treatment with 
Dr. Morgan who prescribed her medications and took her off work for a few weeks. 
(Medical pages 23-25). On May 15, 2000, Dr. Morgan wrote a prescription taking Mrs. 
Wood off work for at least three to four months because of stress. (Medical page 21). 
Dr. Morgan's notes reflect that Mrs. Wood continued to experience significant anxiety, 
that she was easily tearful, suffering panic attacks, crying spells, headaches, sleep 
disturbance, fear of being in public, fear of driving, fear of work, racing heart, and 
shortness of breath. (Medical page 22). On October 14, 2000, Dr. Morgan took Mrs. 
Wood off work for an undetermined period of time because of her inability to be around 
people. (Medical page 17). In a letter dated March 5, 2002, Dr. Morgan stated that Mrs. 
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Wood's stress and anxiety were directly related to her employment. (Medical page 11A). 
Dr. Morgan stated in this letter that Mrs. Wood's stress increases significantly when she 
contemplates a return to work and that Mrs. Wood will not be able to return to work 
because of this stress. (Medical page 11A). 
Mrs. Wood also began seeing Dr. Carlisle, a psychologist. Dr. Carlisle noted that 
Mrs. Wood became more stressed when she heard the radio. (Medical page 48). He 
noted that she wanted to return to work and felt that she had let everyone down because 
she had left. (Medical page 46). Nine months after leaving work she was still crying at 
every therapy session because she could not go back to work. (Medical page 46). Dr. 
Carlisle stated that Mrs. Wood was married to her job as much if not more than she was 
married to her husband. (Medical page 48). He determined that her breakdown came 
from accumulated stress over a period of several years. (Medical page 48). At the time 
of this note in November of 2001, Dr. Carlisle did not believe that Mrs. Wood would ever 
be able to work a full-time job again. (Medical page 48). In a letter dated November 27, 
2000, Dr. Carlisle stated that "the pressures of her job have been extreme" and that "there 
is no doubt in my mind that this is related to her work." (Medical page 45). 
Mrs. Wood also saw Karl Kraync at the division of rehabilitation services to help 
her find new employment. (R. 34-35). Mr. Kraync provided the only assessment in the 
record from a vocational perspective about the nature of Mrs. Wood's work. He 
determined that the stress of Mrs. Wood's work was "intense." (R. page 35). He also 
stated that Mrs. Wood was not employable for the foreseeable future. (R. page 35). 
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Mrs. Wood testified at the hearing that her condition has significantly improved 
since she left work. (Hearing page 81). But her psychologist told her that an attempt to 
return to work could be fatal. (Hearing page 82). 
Facts Supporting the Appeals Board 
Dr. George Mooney saw Mrs. Wood at the request of the respondents. (R. 148-1 
to 148-10). Like all others who have evaluated Mrs. Wood, Dr. Mooney determined that 
she was unable to work despite the fact that her condition was generally improving. 
(Medical page 8). Dr. Mooney believed that, contrary to the opinions of Dr. Morgan, Dr. 
Carlisle, and Mr. Kraync, that Mrs. Wood's disability was only partially related to work. 
(Medical page 9). In Dr. Mooney's opinion, Mrs. Wood suffered anxiety related to a 
variety of sources including chronic pain, somatization, and stress intolerance due to a 
bout with encephalitis. (Medical page 8). Dr. Mooney also opined that Mrs. Wood's 
work environment involved only routine stresses both for EUB and for her industry in 
general. (Medical page 9). 
The Medical Panel authorized by the ALJ agreed with Dr. Mooney that only a 
portion of Mrs. Wood's current disability was due to work related stress. (R. page 61). 
The medical panel cited evidence of severe back pain and a possible predisposition to 
stress and anxiety as other sources for her current mental difficulties. (R. page 61). The 
medical panel apportioned 50% of the current disability to her work and EUB. (R. page 
61). 
Mrs. Wood testified that the stress she endured was the same stress endured by all 
employees at EUB. (Hearing page 103). She testified that the average sales person 
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stayed on the job for a year or less because of the stress and that her twenty years staying 
with the radio sales job was extremely unusual. (Hearing page 42). While Mrs. Wood 
testified that she worked harder than anyone else, (Hearing page 58), she admitted that 
the policy was that she was required to work from 8:30 A.M. to 5:30 P.M., the same as 
the other employees. (Hearing pages 59-60). Mrs. Wood also offered hearsay testimony 
that she heard from her "boot camp" trainer that 98% of all radio sales people end up 
divorced because of the stress of the job. (Hearing page 31). 
The Decision of the ALJ 
The ALJ determined that Mrs. Wood was disabled and had met both the legal and 
factual causation standards of the statute. The ALJ applied the two part test from Utah 
Code Ann. § 34A-3-106 requiring that Mrs. Wood first show that she suffered an 
extraordinary mental stress and second that the stress was extraordinary when judged in 
comparison with national employment and non-employment life. (R. page 73). The ALJ 
determined that the first part of the test was a subjective test where the term "stress" was 
used to describe Mrs. Wood's reaction to a stimulus. (R. page 73). The ALJ determined 
that the second part of the test was an objective test where the term "stress" was used by 
the legislature to refer to the stimuli that caused her condition. (R. page 73). The ALJ 
objectively compared the "stress" in step two to the "usual stress of everyday work and 
non-work life generally in the late 20th century." (R. page 73). 
The ALJ found that Mrs. Wood suffered a nervous breakdown that resulted in an 
anxiety disorder marked by depression and severe panic attacks. (R. page 73). The ALJ 
found that Mrs. Wood experienced symptoms such as being unable to easily leave her 
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home, difficulty in social situations, and difficulty riding in a car. (R. page 73). The ALJ 
concluded that these facts established an extraordinary reaction to the work stresses 
sufficient to satisfy step one of the test. (R. page 73). 
The ALJ found that Mrs. Wood's workplace was extraordinarily stressful because 
Mrs. Wood was required to work all hours of the day and night as well as weekends; she 
was required to work more than a forty-hour work week; she was routinely required to 
pick up the work loads of other employees when they quit; because, aside from her 
regular duties Mrs. Wood was required to train new employees; she was demoted for 
taking a medical leave of absence; she was required to be available for phone calls on two 
cell phones from the early morning to late night; she was subject to public reprimand 
both herself and as witness to the reprimand of other employees; she was required to 
attend "boot camp" training seminars where she was humiliated in front of others; she 
was the responsible party for the radio station, taking the blame for any mistakes whether 
she made them or not; and she was often the only person responsible for EUB's entire 
account list. (R. pages 74-75). The ALJ concluded that these facts were sufficient to 
establish that Mrs. Wood worked in an environment that exposed her to an extraordinary 
amount of mental stress when compared with national employment and non-employment 
life. (R. pages 75-76). Thus, the ALJ concluded that Mrs. Wood satisfied both of the 
prongs and was disabled within the meaning of the Utah Occupational Disease Act. (R. 
page 76). 
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The Decision of the Appeals Board 
The Appeals Board determined in a 2-1 split decision that Mrs. Wood did not meet 
the legal causation standard of the statute. The Appeals Board first determined that the 
term "stress" referred to a causative stimulus as it is used in the statute. (R. page 140). 
The Appeals Board held that Mrs. Wood had to show that the stress she suffered was 
extraordinary when objectively compared with the normal stress of modern employment 
and non-employment life. (R. page 141). The Appeals Board then looked at several 
factors concerning the stress at Mrs. Wood's work including the heavy work load, the 
long hours, and her intense and powerful supervisor. (R. page 141). The Appeals Board 
cited Mrs. Wood's testimony that all other sales people at her station were under the same 
stress as she was. (R. page 141). Based on these facts, the Appeals Board concluded that 
the stress at Mrs. Wood's job was substantial but that it was not extraordinary when 
compared with the demands of modern employment and nonemployment life. (R. page 
141). 
The Dissent of Mr. Hatch 
Mr. Hatch argued in his dissent that the majority applied the incorrect legal 
causation standard in determining whether Mrs. Wood met the definition in the statute. 
Mr. Hatch argued that the majority did not apply the national employment and 
nonemployment standard but rather applied a standard specific to both Mrs. Wood's 
workplace and her industry. (R. page 142). Mr. Hatch concluded that when compared 
with the national employment and nonemployment life rather that the more narrow 
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application made by the majority, Mrs. Wood's work stress was extraordinary and he 
would have affirmed the ALJ decision. (R. page 143). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The standard of review in this case is the correction of error standard because the 
issue concerns whether the Labor Commission correctly applied Section 106 of the 
Occupational Disease Act to the facts of this case. Section 106 requires that an employee 
show both legal and medical causation to establish a mental stress claim. Legal causation 
requires that the employee establish that the stresses of his or her workplace were 
extraordinary when compared to contemporary national employment and nonemployment 
life. In the present case, the Appeals Board failed to compare the stress of Mrs. Wood's 
employment with contemporary national employment and nonemployment life. Instead 
the Appeals Board compared her employment to her own profession. Thus, the Appeals 
Board failed to correctly apply Section 106 and this Court should reverse and remand this 
case for further consideration. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 provides with regard to appellate court review of 
agency decisions that 
(4) the appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's 
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been 
substantially prejudiced by any of the following: 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law 
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(g) the agency action is based on a determination of fact, made or implied 
by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in 
light of the whole record before the court. 
Courts generally grant great deference to an agency's findings of fact and will 
uphold them if they are supported by substantial evidence. Stokes v. Bd. of Review of the 
Indus. Comm 'n of Utah, 832 P.2d 56, 58 (Utah 1992) (citations omitted). When making 
a substantial evidence determination, the court reviews the entire record before the court. 
Id. The Petitioner must marshal all of the evidence supporting the agency decision and 
then show that despite the evidence the findings are not supported by substantial 
evidence. Id. However, the substantial evidence rule does not apply when a reviewing 
court is examining agency application or interpretation of statutory language. 
When a reviewing court examines whether an agency correctly interpreted or 
applied the law the court must first determined whether the agency was either expressly 
or impliedly granted discretion to interpret the language in question. Stokes, 832 P.2d at 
58. If there is no explicit or implicit grant of discretion a correction-of-error standard is 
applied when reviewing the agency's interpretation or application of the statute. Id. The 
Industrial Commission has not been given, either expressly or impliedly, discretion in 
construing the specific language of the statute. Id. Therefore, because this case presents 
the single issue of whether the agency correctly interpreted and/or applied Utah Code 
Ann. § 34A-3-106, the correct standard of review here is whether the Appeals Board 
correctly applied the statute to the facts of this case. Id. 
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II. THE LABOR COMMISSION APPEALS BOARD ERRED BY APPLYING 
THE INCORRECT LEGAL CAUSATION STANDARD TO THE FACTS 
OF THIS CASE 
This case should be remanded for further consideration of whether the facts 
establish that the stress Mrs. Wood was subject to was extraordinary when objectively 
compared with contemporary national employment and nonemployment life. Utah Code 
Ann. § 34A-3-106 establishes that mental stress claims are compensable under the Utah 
Occupational Disease Act. Section 106(6) requires that the employee show both legal 
and medical causation by a preponderance of the evidence to establish a compensable 
claim. 
Section 106 requires "proof of extraordinary mental stress arising predominantly 
and directly from employment" to establish legal causation. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-
106(2)(a). Section 106(2)(b) provides that the extraordinary nature of the stress should 
be judged "according to an objective standard in comparison with contemporary national 
employment and nonemployment life." The issue in this case concerns whether the 
Appeals Board correctly applied this definition of extraordinary stress to the facts of the 
case. 
Section 106 closely follows the principles established in Allen v. Industrial 
Commission, 729 P.2d. 15 (Utah 1986) for evaluation of cases where the claimant suffers 
from a preexisting condition. The Court in Allen sought to reconcile several conflicting 
lines of cases into a more manageable umbrella analysis. Part of this analysis focused on 
a person who brought a preexisting condition to the workplace. The Court set forth a rule 
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that required the employee to show both legal and medical causation in a manner similar 
to Section 106. 
For legal causation, Allen requires that the employee show that the employment 
"contributed something substantial to increase the risk he already faced in everyday life 
because of his condition." Allen, 729 P.2d at 25. The Court cautioned that the 
precipitating exertion should not be compared with the usual exertions of the individual 
worker but with usual exertions of nonemployment life. Id. at 26 Therefore, the rule 
adopted by the Court requires exertion be compared with "exertions of normal 
nonemployment life of this or any other person." Id. at 26 (citations omitted). 
In Stouffer Foods Corporation v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 801 P.2d 179 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990), this Court applied the Allen test in the context of a claim for a 
repetitive stress injury. The employee, Green, was hired by Stouffer to breakdown and 
clean food processing equipment. Part of his job required that he use high pressure hoses 
to clean the equipment. The handles of the hoses Green used required him to constantly 
apply pressure. Id. at 180. After about two weeks of work Green's hands and wrists 
were hurting so badly that he was unable to continue. Id. Green was diagnosed with 
carpal tunnel syndrome. Id. at 181. The Court looked whether the repetitive use of the 
hose was sufficient to establish an injury under Allen. 
The Court found that repeated exposure to what may generally be considered usual 
exertion may satisfy the requirements of Allen if the amount of exposure was greater than 
that experienced in normal everyday life by most people. The Court began by reiterating 
the principle in Allen that the extraordinary nature of the exertion is not judged in 
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comparison with the particular employee's usual exertion but with the usual exertions of 
normal nonemployment life in general. Stouffer, 801 P.2d at 183. The Court found that 
while using a hose similar to the one Green used may be typical of everyday life, the 
constant uses Green was exposed to for hours at a time were not typical nonemployment 
activity. Id. The Court stated that "the test is not whether the type of exertion which 
caused the injury is unknown in employment life, but whether the cumulative work-
related exertion exceeds the normal level in nonemployment life. Id. at 184. 
The legal causation standard provided in Section 106 exactly mirrors the legal 
causation standard of Allen except that it adds the additional requirement that the stress 
be extraordinary when objectively compared with national employment life.4 As Allen 
and Stouffer make clear, it is not appropriate to look at the employee's particular stresses 
when determining legal causation. The comparison for extraordinary stress must be 
made to national employment and nonemployment life in general. Furthermore, the 
extent of repetitive exposure to the same sort of stress must be objectively compared to 
the exposure to that stress in national employment and nonemployment life, not the 
particular requirements of that person's job or the stresses in that person's personal life. 
With these principles of law in mind, Mrs. Wood has clearly sustained her burden of 
showing that she was exposed to extraordinary stress when objectively compared to 
national employment and non-employment life. Mrs. Wood was subject to many stresses 
that we are all subject to in our regular lives at work and away from work. However, for 
Section 106 was first enacted in 1995, about ten years after the Allen decision. Thus, it is 
reasonable to assume that the legislature based the statute on Allen and intended that Allen and its 
progeny be used to provide guidance in applying and interpreting its specific provisions. 
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her those stresses were constant and unrelenting. She was required to handle a heavy 
workload that required that she begin work at 5:00 A.M. and often continue working until 
6:00 P.M. or even later. She had to be constantly available to her boss and her customers 
who both frequently yelled at her and criticized her work. She was often the only person 
responsible for her employer's entire list of accounts and she managed every aspect of 
those accounts from sales to collections. She took the blame for everything that went 
wrong with an account even if she was not personally responsible because she was the 
face of the radio station to its clients. The stressfulness of her work is manifested by the 
fact that most of the station's sales people did not last more than a year. 
The Appeals Board supports its decision with very little in the way of facts. The 
majority opinion states that many occupations impose demands on worker time and 
impose pressures for performance. The decision specifically cited Mrs. Wood's 
testimony that all radio sales positions involved the same types of demands that she 
experienced. This reasoning exposes the fact that the Appeals Board did not objectively 
compare Mrs. Wood's work environment with national employment and nonemployment 
life. In fact, the word "national" does not appear in the Appeals Board analysis nor does 
mention any nonemployment life. Contrary to the law, the Appeals Board failed to 
objectively compare Mrs. Wood's work environment to contemporary national 
employment and nonemployment life. 
Furthermore, the only evidence addressing whether Mrs. Wood's work environment 
was more stressful than others supports her claim. The letter from her vocational 
counselor, Karl Kraync, states that Mrs. Wood was subject to "long term and intense 
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occupational stress." (R. 35). He states further that Mrs. Wood "worked in an intensely 
competitive and driving environment for an extended period of time." Id. This evidence 
is supported by the opinions of Drs. Morgan and Carlisle who both stated that Mrs. 
Wood's work environment was extraordinarily stressful. The Respondents did not 
introduce any vocational evidence addressing the nature of Mrs. Wood's work stress. 
While it can be fairly said that all workers are exposed to the sorts of stresses Mrs. Wood 
experienced at some point in their lives, very few are exposed to these stresses on a 
constant basis for twenty years from morning 'till night. A more narrow application of 
Section 106 would eviscerate the purpose and effect of the statute. Therefore, the Court 
should remand this case for reconsideration of the facts as they objectively apply to 
contemporary national employment and nonemployment life. 
CONCLUSION 
Section 106 requires that the Labor Commission objectively evaluate mental stress 
claims in comparison to contemporary national employment and nonemployment life. 
The Appeals Board evaluated Mrs. Wood's case by referencing other jobs similar to Mrs. 
Wood's rather that national employment and nonemployment life as whole. Thus, the 
Court should remand this case with the instruction that the Appeals Board apply the 
"contemporary national employment and nonemployment" life test to the facts of this 
case. 
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